Introduction:

The history of law schools is one of transformation. From the Inns of Court in London to the modern university, from informal ad hoc teaching to formalized accreditation, from law schools experimenting in techniques and methods to the dominance of a single method of instruction.

The history is also a battle of ideas. Ideas over what the law is, how it should be taught and the kinds of students a law school should produce. Frequently, law schools have been the battleground of fierce intellectual rivalries, with rival schools of thought battling for supremacy and control over the future of the curriculum. The major battle has been between those who saw law as a liberal art and those who saw law as a science or trade, with an instrumental, technocratic or doctrinal mindset. Admittedly, there have been other forces at play; those who sought to teach law as a ‘gentlemanly’ art or as part of a Christian mission or those who sought to cement the status quo. However, even in these few instances, the battle has been between those who sought to teach law broadly and those who sought to teach law narrowly. Over time, the latter group has largely prevailed, creating the modern legal education system that we know today, one that is dominated by a view of law as a technical skill, taught narrowly as a vocation or trade.

The dominance of the vocational philosophy of law arose in large part due to the formalization of legal training over the last two hundred years; the addition of rules and regulations on teaching and learning, the creation of admission requirements, examinations, grades, graduate attributes, university procedures and so on. The sheer number of these systems entrenched existing educational methods in place and paralysed legal education reform. The more formal the curriculum became, the more rigid it became, and the more immune it became to experimentation and innovation. The early experimental nature of the first law schools and the even earlier apprenticeship method was quickly lost in time to the solidification of accreditation methods, the establishment of the core units of study and the compulsory subject requirements, and finally, the dominance of the case method of instruction.

Reformers seeking to change legal education after its solidification (arguably in the period between 1890-1920) were frequently met with derision for trying to upset the status quo.[1] The dominant case method was seen to produce lawyers who thought in the right way, possessed the right skills and were fit to serve their role in the economy. In at least one instance, an attempt was made to write competing views out of history completely.[2] As the number of law schools ballooned in common law countries, a homogenous image of legal education developed, producing a homogenous, technical training devoid of critical thinking and reasoning.

In this history chapter, I intend to document the changes to law schools as they occurred in common law countries. As such, law schools in key common law countries shall be discussed, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. The bulk of the history will look at the ‘molten era’ of legal education in the colonial age, between the 1800s to1930s, in these countries respectively. It is in this period, I argue, that the modern law school was developed and a vocational view of law cemented in the curriculum of the major law schools of each respective country.

There will be four parts to my discussion. Firstly, I discuss the origins of modern legal education in the common law, dating back to the 1200s in England, through the apprenticeship era of the Middle Ages up until the 1800s and to the establishment of common law courses at English universities. Secondly, I discuss the American law school, the first of which was founded under George Wythe and Thomas Jefferson, and their bold ideals for a liberal arts political school of law. Thirdly, I discuss the battle of ideas in legal education in the 1800s and early 1900s, between those who saw law as a liberal art and those who saw law as a science. Finally, I discuss how the case method and vocational training came to dominate Australia and the other English colonies.

Early Law Schools in England: From the Inns of Court, to the Apprenticeships and University Law Schools:

From the dark ages to the middle ages, legal education in England was centred on Roman and Canon law.[3] Training in law was informal and undertaken outside of a centralized system.[4] Although much can be written about legal education in this period, there is very little that can be said about the training of lawyers in the common law, which was only taught from the 1200s and onwards.[5]

The history of legal education in the common law began at the Inns of Court in London in the 1200s.[6] Established as institutions providing “legal training” to aspiring lawyers, the Inns were residential premises located conveniently close to Fleet Street and the royal courts.[7] Students were trained by “observing proceedings in court” by barristers while debating each other in residence, holding moots and mock trials.[8] The training provided was informal and varied on a case-by-case basis. However, after the invention of the printing press, the Inns gave students “manuals and books” to aid them in their studies.[9] By the fifteenth century “readings and lectures” in law were given by “senior students” and practicing lawyers.[10] This was a more formal style of education but it remained informal by modern standards, lacking any formal requirements outside of the “attendance at a required number of meals”.[11] There are still vestiges of this education in the Inns today, with lectures and talks held by prominent members of the profession, although the more formal aspects of legal training have shifted to the newer English universities.[12]

The Inns were elitist institutions. Their aim was not to produce law clerks or employees in the modern meaning of the term, but to create “gentlemen” for a particular class of society.[13] Students were trained not only in law but in the “moral and social” aspects of life, including the fine “arts” and “music and dance”.[14] This matched a broader focus of tertiary education in England in the 1700s, where education mainly acted as a foray for the rich.[15] The major universities at the time were more like “summer camps” for the landed gentry, many of whom “rarely [bothered] to graduate” and spent most of their time “gaming and feasting,” instead of studying.[16] Those aspiring to become lawyers at the Inns were of this higher class background, voluntarily seeking a career in law rather than acting out of necessity for wealth or prestige.

Although the aim of the Inns was the production of ‘gentlemen,’ such an aim can be seen as similar to the “broad-minded” aim of liberal arts colleges today.[17] Where the Inns were motivated by class or social status in their teaching, today a liberal arts college is motivated by the cultural enrichment of the individual, or the creation of ‘citizens’.[18] In both cases, the content taught amounts to a broad minded education in music, art and critical thought.[19]

The Inns can likewise be viewed as a medieval precursor to the modern law school and the apprenticeship method of training, largely because they trained students through lectures and court observation, much like that which occurs today.

Legal education at the Inns ended at the start of the English Civil War in 1642, to be replaced by apprenticeships in barrister’s chambers and law firms.[20] Apprenticeships involved students “observing all the work” of a solicitor before trying their “own hand at the work”.[21] By 1729 English law required attorneys and solicitors to spend five years in a legal office before being admitted to practice.[22]

The work of the apprentices was often dull and repetitive.[23] They mainly “took care of paperwork,” “ran errands,” wrote down precedents, and scrambled to learn “as best they could” between these various tasks.[24] The quality of the training provided depended almost entirely on the personality of the supervising solicitor.[25] The most interesting stories came out of the American colonies. The colonies never had an Inn of Court equivalent, and from 1700, legal education was exclusively done by apprenticeship.[26] Despite the informality of this system, some of the most famous names in American history were taught under the apprenticeship model in the 1700s: John Adams, John Marshall, Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson, to name a few.[27]

Key to a positive experience was whether or not the supervising solicitor provided a diverse reading list to the apprentice.[28] Some apprentices received a wide training in what would today be considered the liberal arts of history, philosophy and legal theory. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of this is the case of the young Thomas Jefferson who was apprenticed to the solicitor George Wythe in 1762.[29] Under Wythe, Jefferson was trained not only in law (mainly English texts, including Blackstone), but also in various books on “history, moral philosophy and ethics,” along with the philosophy of governance.[30] Jefferson’s apprenticeship produced arguably the sharpest lawyer in the American colonies at the time, and his grasp of governance, philosophy and the principles of law assisted in his writing of the Declaration of Independence.

The drawbacks of apprenticeships were apparent, however, in the wildly different experiences of various apprentices: from positive, broad-minded training like Jefferson’s, to daily “drudgery” and boredom.[31] Having to rely on a supervisor’s personal preference in books limited the opportunity for a truly broad-minded education. One risk was that a supervising solicitor would only train an apprentice in their office’s narrow area of law, rather than in law as a field. In Jefferson’s case, he simply struck it lucky that Wythe had his own large private library, from which he could lend him books.[32] The variation in training was due to a lack of any formalized structure as to how someone was to apprentice. There were no examinations, rules or credentials for students or their supervisors.[33] Apprentices received no lectures or centralised training.[34] In the absence of a curriculum, many students relied on famous English books on law to serve as a substitute, including Blackstone’s Commentaries.[35] This lack of broad reading however, resulted in training that was frequently practical and technical in nature, rather than training which illuminated the broader contextual background and theory of law.[36]

Those who defended the apprenticeship model argued that law was a technical skill that could only be learnt on the job, not in any school or university.[37] A.V. Dicey suggested at the time that only “from actual business” could a student learn the ability of discerning the facts of a case and applying “the appropriate principles of law” to a new set of circumstances.[38]

When the idea of university law schools began appearing, Dicey thereby called them out as completely impractical.[39] He said at the time:

The merits, in short, of the present [apprenticeship] system may all be summed up in the one word “reality”. It brings a student in contact with the real actual business, and fosters in him qualities which cannot be produced by any theoretical teaching, however excellent.[40] [Emphasis added]

Decades earlier, William Blackstone argued the opposing view. Blackstone was appointed the first professor in common law at Oxford in 1758, establishing the first university-based law school in the common law world.[41] In Blackstone’s view, the apprenticeship model was inadequate in its scope, means and aims. Apprenticeships only gave students a practical understanding of the law rather than an understanding of the “principles upon which the rules of practice [were] founded”.[42] Instead, Blackstone said that students should study at a university law school founded on the liberal arts, where law could be taught as a broader discipline of study.[43]

In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote that law could only be taught as part of a broader “liberal education” at a university, rather than as a “mechanical part of business” in an apprenticeship.[44] The study of law would “flourish best in the neighbourhood of [and] in assistance drawn from [the] other arts”.[45] Law could be combined at a university with a study of logic and reasoning, legal history, comparative law, “experimental philosophy” and the classics of Greece and Rome.[46] Trusting our lives and the governance of our country to men without a liberal education, Blackstone wrote, and without a wider reading of the liberal arts, would be dangerous and lead to the creation of bad legislation.[47]

Blackstone’s unique cross-disciplinary idea of a law school was first tested at Oxford, where his lectures in the 1750s formed the basis of his famous Commentaries.[48] Blackstone’s approach was to teach law not by means of cases but by summarising legal principles as they existed in that time.[49] He frequently cited statute law instead of case law, to point out a particular way in which the law operated.[50] He encouraged students to get to their own “scientific method” of understanding the law, rather than teaching to them or proscribing to them a particular method.[51] In all cases, he suggested students look to the “origins” and original purposes of the law, rather than just see law as a “mechanical practice”.[52] In particular, his Commentaries contained “criticisms” of the failings of case law and suggested law reform.[53] His approach was to write in an essay-format in a way that “even laymen could read without disgust,” so as to make his writing easily accessible to students.[54] As a result, his Commentaries stood the test of time. They were widely celebrated at the time and are widely regarded today; they likewise formed the basic teaching materials of the original American law schools.[55]

Blackstone’s initial forays into university education had a very small immediate influence on legal education in the subsequent decades.[56] It would be fifty years until a second law school, Cambridge, would start a curriculum in “English Law”.[57] The first degree in law would only emerge seventy-six years after Blackstone’s lectures, as an LLB at the University College, London, in 1826.[58] By 1846, the House of Commons Select Committee on Legal Education wrote that there was “no legal education [in England] worthy of its name”.[59] The committee recommended that legal education should be taught at universities, combining both professional and broader educational aims, teaching culture and vocational skills while producing “gentlemen”.[60]

Following the committee’s findings, Queen’s College Birmingham created a law department in 1849.[61] The college offered the first English LLB, taught under the Charles Rann Kennedy.[62] Charles Kennedy believed that law students should be taught law as part of a broader “classical education”.[63] His law faculty said it was “highly desirable” for future solicitors and attorneys to be trained in “Classics, Mathematics and General Science” prior to their study of law.[64] To this end, entry into Queen’s College law school required a B.A. as a first or combined degree.[65] Students in the law faculty were taught from Blackstone’s and Kent’s respective Commentaries, but were also taught English legal History, Bentham’s Treatise on morals and the role of Parliament and the Church in creating laws.[66]

Charles Kennedy insisted that the law faculty cater to the “general student” and that law be seen as a “general degree” with origins in the faculty of arts.[67] To this end, he taught the “science of jurisprudence,” while aiming to create a “cultured person” in his students.[68] He insisted that law be studied as “an institution of [the student’s country],” with an intimate relationship to politics, “natural and… moral law” and the study of ethics.[69] In this, he was again aiming for the creation of cultured gentlemen, trained not only in law but a wider liberal arts understanding of the world.

Charles Kennedy’s term as professor at Queen’s College was short lived and much of what he had worked to achieve was abandoned.[70] He resigned from the law school after two years, having only taught nine students, in large part due to conflicts with the profession and his own personal circumstances.[71]

Following the experiments at Queen’s College, degrees at the other universities soon followed.[72] A B.A. in jurisprudence began at Oxford in 1852, followed by an LLB at “Cambridge… in 1855, and Durham… in 1858,” at “Owen College Manchester in 1880 and University College Liverpool in 1892”.[73]

Examinations “for solicitors and attorneys” came about in England in 1860, in large part due to a new Royal Commission into legal education in 1855.[74] These initial examinations cemented the modern law school in England, and set about the start of the formalization of legal education that continued for the next two hundred years.

Despite the appearance of new degrees and examinations however, students would continue to go on to an apprenticeship after their studies. This remains the case to this day, as trainee solicitors in England are still required to fulfil a ‘training contract’ or period of apprenticeship upon graduation from a law school.[75] In this way, the vocational nature of legal education was enshrined as a core requirement – England adopting a hybrid approach of both formal education and apprenticeship.[76] Historically and today, there is no direct path between law schools and the legal profession in England and no formal examination requirements that can supplement an apprenticeship at a firm.[77]

 

The First American Law School:

The first law school in America was established at the college of William and Mary in Virginia in 1779.[78] As governor of Virginia, it was Thomas Jefferson who established the first school, asking his former mentor and supervisor George Wythe to become the first professor of law in the country.[79] Wythe brought the same approach to legal education as he had brought to his apprenticeship of Jefferson.[80] The idea was to teach law in its wider context, allowing students to read landmark legal texts like Blackstone’s Commentaries but also to look more widely at the political theory, classical literature, civics, history and economics behind law.[81] Wythe told his students to visit parliament frequently and “to attend other lectures at the college”.[82] Law, he suggested, could only be understood with this wider understanding of the liberal arts. In this way, Wythe mimicked the earlier thoughts of Blackstone.[83] Indeed, the law school at William and Mary can be seen as a spiritual successor to Oxford’s approach.

At William and Mary however, Wythe was arguable more experimental than Oxford. Part of his belief was the idea that law related directly to politics and government, and that this should be taught at the school. From the start, Wythe established a mock legislative assembly at the school, where students debated legislative proposals, proposed amendments and law reform and learnt about legislative procedures, all while Wythe acted “as speaker of the house”.[84] He trained students to read further in the fields of government and public policy, matching this practical training.[85]

At the time, Thomas Jefferson called Wythe’s law school one of the foremost places to “train students to take positions of leadership in the national councils of America”.[86] He was more prescient than he could imagine in making the comment. Wythe’s students ended up in almost every senior position in America’s fledgling government.[87] These included two presidents, numerous judges, a chief justice of the Supreme Court, a federal secretary of state and a federal attorney general, among other legislators.[88] His class was arguably the most successful generation of law students of all time.[89] His methods, unconventional as they may appear today, seem to be the origin of this success.

Wythe’s training had an indelible effect on the young and rising Jefferson, who revealed much in his own writings of the ways in which Wythe taught. The two men were of a similar mind when it came to law.[90] When asked about the study of law, Jefforson recommended a diverse reading list, much like Wythe would do.[91] This included a broad reading of “history, politics, physics, oratory, poetry, criticism” and more, all of which Jefferson saw as essential “to form an accomplished lawyer”.[92] This idea of a lawyer has been lost in recent times, and it is interesting to look back on Jefferson’s ideals of law as more “cosmopolitan” in its scope and teaching than a modern law school today.[93] Indeed, Jefferson’s ideal law school was “liberal, well-rounded in both its legal and general aspects, and supported by well-chosen readings”.[94] He did not see law school as a place for practical training alone. Instead, he believed the study of law itself could be undertaken through intense periods of private readings.[95] The university was not there to teach students the law per se, in Jefferson’s view, but to expand their minds beyond what they might be otherwise able to accomplish in their own time. The university was there to enrich and extend students beyond their own capacity.

And it also served society. In Jefferson’s view, a proper university education would create a generation of lawyers dedicated to “public virtue” – or “the preference for the greater good over one’s individual interest”.[96] In his day, Jefferson suggested that the “spirit of commerce… knows no country, and feels no passion or principle but that of gain”.[97] The idea that lawyers should serve themselves or their clients above the public was fundamentally opposed to Jefferson’s conception of the law. In his foundational view of the Republic, America was to be a place which would practice Montesquieu’s ideal of self-sacrifice and public service, over and above greed and personal, monetary pursuits.[98]

 

 

The Rise of the Modern Law School:

The modern law school began under Christopher Langdell at Harvard University, between 1869-1870.[99] Under reforms begun in 1869, Langdell taught students at Harvard Law School for the first time using the Socratic method and the accompanying case method.[100] The case method involved students finding legal principles in a case and applying those principles to a new set of factual circumstances. This is said to mirror the professional or technical work of a lawyer. The Socratic method involved quizzing students about those facts and principles in a classroom as part of an interrogation. The case method, and to a lesser extent the Socratic method, still dominate legal education across the Western world, from England and America to Australia.

In contrast to earlier lectures at law schools, apprenticeships or even at the Inns of Court, students of Langdell’s Harvard in the late 1800s were taught exclusively by means of cases. In an earlier school, one might learn broad legal principles from books like Blackstone’s Commentaries. Under Langdell, students were told to look at cases alone, where they were to find no “right” answers, only competing judicial opinions.[101] Almost instantaneously, legal education became more adversarial in nature. Instead of laws arising from the government, to be documented in an essay-like prose, laws were to be seen as arising from competing perspectives put before a judge. Although this had always necessarily been the case, prior forms of university instruction had never been so explicit in framing the law as solely about competing claims. Langdell’s law school was more personal, transactional: it tended to focus on the individual rather than the government or the wider social context.

Langdell wanted a purely scientific study of law at Harvard. He frequently referred to law as a “science,” meaning a set of objective principles, as opposed to subjective opinions.[102] Law was to be taught as a method of discovering and applying legal principles alone, which were themselves set in stone, rather than a part of a broader conceptual knowledge of government.[103] He focused on professional and analytical training: the idea that the law student would go on to be a lawyer arguing his case in court. His belief in the power of case law singlehandedly to teach students everything there is to know about law tied into a rising, popular legal philosophy of his age: the idea of legal positivism.

In 1934, the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen explained legal positivism as “pure law,” or the teaching of law without the “baggage” of the social sciences of politics, philosophy, morality, religion, history and so on.[104] Kelsen believed that law should be studied in its own right, as an objective body of rules divorced from any other field of study or discipline.[105] This mirrored Langdell’s approach at Harvard in 1869. By teaching law exclusively through cases, Langdell could instil in his students the idea that law was a scientific study, without requiring background knowledge, much like one would study mathematics without needing to know why or how a maths textbook was written. Although this appeared to be a banal philosophy in a law school, legal positivism properly considered was controversial and radical in application. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a contemporary of Langdell, puts the idea in a rather dark context when he says:

Even if every decision required the sanction of an emperor with despotic power and a whimsical turn of mind, we should be interested none the less, still with a view to prediction, in discovering some order, some rational explanation, and some principle of growth for the rules which he laid down.[106]

This obsession with rules and procedures as a science, so conceived, made law school a place where students were systematically made to document a body of rules without reason. A student at Harvard Law School, in this conception, was reminiscent of a protagonist in a Kafka novel, where systems and rules existed that were not to be questioned or explained, justified or reasoned with.[107]

To this day, there are those who say Langdell’s case method shows students “how open is the future of the law”.[108] By contrast, Langdell himself viewed law as largely static. His aim was not to teach how law changed over time, or legal history or comparative law. These subjects interested him little, beyond his basic call for students to study “the principles of law” in cases.[109]

By 1914, Langdell’s case method came to dominate American professional law schools and the greater common law schools in England and Australia.[110] The method was adopted at the same time in Canada at the University of Manitoba, where a number of casebooks were made for students between 1914 and 1915.[111] There, the case method was viewed as a means of making students “conversant with the law” in a way that had been impossible with the previous “dry lecture” method.[112] Alongside the case method, prominent law schools often taught legal writing, legal research and occasionally clinical legal education. In all of these areas, technical skills were viewed as far more important than ‘soft’ or ‘transferable’ skills, and law was to be considered a “science” to be studied in its own right, without reference to other areas of thought.

 

Great Debate Over the Future of Law Schools: Legal Education in a ‘Molten State’

Langdell’s reforms did not occur in a vacuum, nor did they lack in critics both at the time and in the following decades. Having said that, the innovative experiments that occurred at the Inns of Court, in apprenticeships in London and the colony in Virginia at William and Mary would become rarer following Langdell, as rules, procedures and processes developed to limit the flexibility of new law schools. Admission requirements and examinations began to cement a certain kind of educational formula, which placed Langdell’s case method at the heart of instruction. This took place in the wider educational developments of the period in England and America:

By the latter part of the 19^th Century the organization, scope and role of schooling had been fundamentally transformed. In place of a few casual schools dotted across towns and country there existed in most cities true educational systems: fatefully articulated, age graded, hierarchically structured… administered by full time experts and… taught by specially trained staff.[113]

There were however still those who sought to change legal education in the period, and restore the earlier vision of law as a liberal art. Legal education had not yet cemented into Langdell’s formulation completely, and between 1890 and 1920 it was still very much in a ‘molten state,’ capable of being swayed one way or another.

One attempt to sway it in the other direction occurred at Yale and Harvard Law Schools, in the periods between 1910-1919 under the leadership of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and his mentor Roscoe Pound respectively.[114] Pound would go on to become a leading voice of American sociological jurisprudence, refuting Langdell’s understanding of law as a static set of objective rules.[115] Although he would go on to adopt the case method as dean of Harvard law in the 1930s, in his younger days Pound was vocally opposed to strict, rigid understandings of the law.[116] In this earlier period, the two men worked on a very ambitious agenda of transforming legal education towards a greater emphasis on “social realities,” philosophy and jurisprudence.[117]

Beginning in 1903 Pound launched a blistering attack on the dominant method of legal education, formulated under Langdell.[118] Instead of merely teaching legal principles to be found in cases, Pound said, law schools “can and should do more”.[119] He argued for the teaching of comparative law, legal philosophy and legal history, for example.[120] More fundamentally, he wanted law schools to be centres of “law reform,” teaching students the “social realities” of law in practice to serve the currents of “public opinion” in a democratic society.[121] Without this link to the public, Pound feared that law students and law professors would remain “legal monks,” disconnected from the society they were meant to serve.[122] In 1912, Pound urged law professors needed to “reconsider the attitudes” of their teaching, to begin to teach law in a manner that served “the purposes and policies of modern lawmaking”.[123] He believed that law schools should start teaching “sociology, economics and politics to ‘fit new generations of lawyers to lead the people,’ rather than merely giving students vocational training.”[124] In many ways, his writings are reminiscent of Jefferson and Wythe in the days of William and Mary, advocating a law school with a primary focus on government, advocacy and politics.

Professor Hohfeld of Yale Law School joined Pound in his pursuit at the time. Hohfeld saw Pound very much as a mentor figure, seeking to impress him with achievement in the field. In 1914 he began demanding a suite of liberal arts focused reforms at Yale Law School.[125] His vision was for a law school that taught the “analytic, historical, critical, legislative, functional and empirical” understandings of the law.[126] Only out of the “chaos” of these competing perspectives, could the “order” of understanding the law correctly arise in a student, thought Hohfeld.[127] Students were to be taught to question the “intrinsic [and] extrinsic” logic of law, including the “psychological, ethical, political, social and economic bases of the various competing doctrines”.[128] Moving beyond mere case law, students would question where the cases came from, how they arose and why. Both Hohfeld and Pound were inspired by the French legal sociologist Eugene Ehrlich in this, who suggested:

It is not enough to be conscious that the law is living… we must rather be conscious that it is part of human life… in a sense, everything human is a part of it.[129]

Hohfeld’s pursuit was largely unsuccessful in swaying the trajectory of American legal education. Some argue that this was due to personal failures: a tendency to make laundry lists of demands rather than sticking to simple principles.[130] The case method, after all, was simplistic and simplicity often dominates a field where complex ideas are viewed as too difficult to implement by teachers. Nonetheless, Hohfeld did have an influence on Yale Law School at least, influencing several member of the faculty to take up his reform proposals at the school. In his time, Yale Law staff envisioned a new law school “offering… ‘civic and cultural education’ for ‘non-professional college men,’ and ‘scientific and constructive’ instruction for ‘jurists broadly trained for service in many fields of useful and far reaching activity’ who would study “law and its evolution, historically, comparatively, analytically and critically, with the purpose of directing its development in the future, improving its administration and perfecting its methods of legislation”.[131]

One of the writers of the reforms at Yale Law School was Arthur Corbin, whom pushed for legal education reform at Yale between 1909 and 1943. In Corbin’s view, law was again not to be found definitively in cases as simple legal principles.[132] Instead, these principles were to be regarded by students as “tentative working rules… to be tested and re-examined in the light of the sources from which they were drawn”.[133] The origin of law was as important, if not more so, than the content of the law.[134] As a result, the common law itself could not be seen as perpetually self-justifying lists of precedents, but as “living law”.[135] Judges needed constantly to re-evaluate the “principles, maxims, purposes and policies” of law, as should, Corbin felt, the students at Yale Law School.[136]

Thomas S. Swan, Dean of Yale Law School during this tumultuous period, adopted a slightly more conservative approach than many of his dissenting faculty.[137] He argued that the case method was essential as a basis for the understanding of law, but also recognized, with Pound, Hohfeld and Corbin, that law schools should “aim… to aid in improving the law by scientific and analytical study”.[138] Students should be empowered, Swan argued, to criticise the law as it currently stands and to suggest “improvements… by relating laws to other institutions of human society”.[139] This was perhaps a more scientific way of adapting a liberal arts legal education. By studying laws as they currently stood, and then comparing those laws to “other institutions,” students at Yale could come to a conclusion on whether current laws ‘fit’ the society for which they were intended. It was this wider view of legal education which Swan adopted, and which extended Yale Law School beyond mere vocational training.

 

Innovations in Legal Education in the Colonies:

1. a) Canada:

At the same time as these developments were occurring at Yale, interesting innovations were taking place across the border in Canada. Perhaps the most interesting author on “law as a social science” in the period was the little known dean and founder of the University of Toronto Law School, W.P.M. Kennedy.[140] From 1926, as a professor, and from 1944-1949, as dean of the new law faculty, Kennedy pursued the most ambitious agenda of any dean of the period, seeking to radically change legal education.[141] His contributions were intentionally erased from history by his successor, ‘Caesar’ H. Wright, who largely favoured Langdell’s case method of instruction.[142] Kennedy’s idea of a liberal arts based law school, however, are worth rehabilitating, not only because of their unique scope and depth, but because they arose at a time when legal education was almost unanimously moving in the opposite direction, away from the liberal arts and towards vocationalism.

When W.P.M. Kennedy created the University of Toronto Law School as dean in 1944, he was inspired by the traditions of Oxford and Cambridge rather than the prominent professional school of Osgoode Hall, or the Law Society of Upper Canada.[143] In 1934 he explicitly condemned the prominent case method of Langdell, quoting the Dean of Columbia who called the method “intellectual inbreeding”.[144] According to Kennedy, if a student of law is taught to learn rules from casebooks, this will leave them totally unprepared for legal practice.[145] They will learn “nothing of the history and meaning of the rules,” how the rules relate to everyday life, nor how to develop or reform those rules “to serve society”.[146] At Kennedy’s law school, the prerogative was to “relate law to life not life to law”.[147] Students were tasked with considering the ways in which laws operated upon the world, rather than making their lives revolve around the recitation of legal principles.[148] The professional schools, by contrast, were training law students to be “tradesmen,” or “mere technician[s],” rather than actual lawyers.[149]

By contrast, and rather radically, Kennedy wished to establish the Toronto law school as a school with “no professional ends to serve”.[150] The ‘impracticality’ of the school allowed for a large degree of experimentation in the content of the curriculum and the method of instruction. In Kennedy’s school, professors were “absolutely free to run their own classes.[151] The case method was used in most subjects, but Kennedy preferred “to fit methods to a subject rather than to fit all subjects into a uniformity of [one] method”.[152] This was radically different from the professional schools of the period.

The teaching of law at Toronto was to go beyond vocational training to pursue a deeper “educational purpose” of teaching law as a social science.[153] Law could only be understood “amid the intellectual clash of university activities… in relation to the other social sciences”.[154] Students at Toronto were therefore taught courses in “history,” legal philosophy, “economics, psychology [and] political theory”.[155] The “philosophical foundations” of law were also taught to students.[156] As was the skill of “critical thinking”.[157] Students were encouraged to “criticise what is accepted,” and to “reflect critically on the ‘why,’ not just the ‘what’ and the ‘how,’ of the law.”[158] One student, Bora Laskin, who would later become Chief Justice of Canada, wrote that “even more important than the law he learnt [in Kennedy’s law school], was what he learned ‘about things that affected the law’”.[159] Keneddy’s law school “gave [Laskin] a feeling that law was something more than a narrow discipline”[160]

Kennedy’s wider focus was on using law as a means of social and political change. Students were asked to inquire “into the social worth of legal doctrines” and deduce whether laws served “the ends of society”.[161] In effect, all law students were trained to be law reformers. Seeking to serve “the ends of society” was a vague ambition: it could be asked whose ends would be served by Kennedy’s students and by what judgment was a student able to understand society’s aims? Kennedy answered this by reference to democracy. Students required a “comprehensive survey of social values,” where survey meant a literal undertaking of trying to understand public perception on social issues.[162] Specifically, he pointed to broad ranging principles of governance prevalent in his time, for example, “the interest of a child in a good home, and the interest of the state in conserving resources”.[163] Law was a means of resolving these “problems in political science,” as a functioning arm of democratic government.[164] Kennedy therefore saw law students in a manner in which today we see politicians: those accountable to and responsible for, upholding the will of the people in their pursuit and governance of the law.

It was this fundamental vision which shaped Kennedy’s belief that “law is one of the greatest of university subjects… the fundamental social science on which every aspect of our civilization must inevitably rest”.[165] Law was not simply a means of governing transactions in property, or injury in tort, but a fundamental means of the government in “social engineering” the kind of society the government wished to exist.[166] Kennedy’s students were part of this grand plan of social engineering, and he intended to produce students trained as reformers in law, “the finest of all instruments in the service of mankind”.[167]

This bold vision, much like that of Wythe and Jefferson before him, produced a staggering class of alumna. Arguably “Canada’s greatest criminal lawyer” was taught at Torronto, G. Arthur Martin, as were two chief justices of Ontario, a judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal, a Stanford professor of law and a chief justice of Canada.[168] All within the five years in which Kennedy was dean of Toronto Law School.

His other contribution was the creation of the University of Toronto Law Journal in 1935. It was a first in Canada, being the only “scholarly legal journal in Canada” in its time.[169] It quickly came to dominate legal research at the time, before facing competition from other journals.[170] Kennedy’s vision of the journal was a place in which his ideas of a law school could come to fruition in the academy; a place where law could be considered as part of “community life, of ordered progress, and of social justice”.[171]

Kennedy was joined in this pursuit by various other Canadian thinkers.[172]

Foremost of these was James Aikin, founder of the Canadian Bar Association in 1914, who likewise pushed for a broader, social role for lawyers in Canada.[173] Aikins believed that lawyers should move beyond politicians in their advocacy for social movements and social goals.[174] A lawyer, so defined, would never have a purely private role in society, but always be engaged with the public, working on their behalf as a political actor.[175] Law schools, by extension, would be involved in teaching students “moral fibre” and the knowledge of “law in a big way,” or law in its proper political context, to serve public ends.[176] In Aikin’s view, the law had a role in upholding the values of “civilization,” such as included Christianity and British values.[177] It was thus the law school’s role to teach values to the students, rather than merely teaching them technical knowledge.[178]

The innovations taking place in Canada under Atkin and Kennedy were not to last. Replaced by ‘Caesar’ H Wright as dean, W.P.M. Kennedy was sidelined and Toronto law school became dedicated to the practical and vocational outlook of other law schools in the common law Americas.[179] Wright as dean had a firm commitment to the case method, and decried a focus on law taught as a social science or liberal art.[180] He was joined in this view by various other Canadian lawyers, who criticized Kennedy’s law school as “being of limited practical importance, and indeed having very little to do with the law.”[181]

The professional law school at Osgoode Hall, was likewise a critic of Kennedy’s methods.[182] Interestingly, Osgoode Hall at the time found it impractical to use the case method in all subjects, and only adopted it in half of its curriculum.[183] However, it was also a law school that had rejected jurisprudence completely, tried temporarily “as a first year course,” before being quickly removed from the curriculum.[184] Writers at the time justified the abandonment of jurisprudence by condescendingly suggesting that students could “hardly be expected to be competent to inquire why” the courts did what they did, without being “conversant with a considerable body of law”.[185] So began the now common refrain that students cannot question the law without knowing its content, which in reality, resulted in students never being able to question the law. Osgoode Hall in the 1930s adopted a list of compulsory black letter subjects similar to Australia’s Priestley Eleven, including Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law, Civil Procedure, Company Law, Equity, Constitutional Law, Evidence and so on.[186] Toronto, under Wright, quickly followed suit.[187] Never again would W.P.M. Kennedy’s vision of law as a social science flourish in the Canadian law schools.

Decades later, there was however one last gasp for air for the movement.

In 1983, Harry Arthurs, Dean at Osgoode Hall Law School primary authored a report on the reform of legal education – reawakening Kennedy’s “social science” vision.[188] The report identified a distinct lack of critical Canadian legal research.[189] It placed the blame squarely on the “narrow vocationalism” in Canadian law schools and the teaching of black letter law.[190] Arthurs noted a “tension between the humane intellectual goals of a law faculty and its professional training activities”.[191] He worried that black letter law was eroding the social and public role of law schools in Canada.[192]

To serve their “humane intellectual goals,” Arthurs argued, law schools would have to develop a curriculum that “identified with the humanities and social sciences”.[193] Arthurs’ report concluded with a range of recommendations to this end. Including: that law schools should adopt new elective subjects with clear “social goals”; that they should “encourage interdisciplinary study [of] legal theory”; that the “Undergraduate law school curriculum should include… comparative law, legal problems of disadvantages groups [and the] legal implications… of social and political problems”.[194] These proposals aimed to revolutionalize the way law was taught and to open it up to new disciplines, ideas and discussions.

Unfortunately, the report had little tangible impact in Canada.[195] The law schools continued teaching a narrow, black letter, vocational version of law.[196] Although he had good recommendations, Arthurs proposed very few teaching methods by which to implement his reforms.[197] This was a key flaw in the report. Without a practical ‘how-to’ guide, it was difficult for lecturers to understand how to implement what amounted to conceptual goals and visions. To this day, Canadian law schools remain wedded to a vocational, technical skills approach to the teaching of law.

 

1. b) Australia

The history of legal education in Australia matched the vocational trajectory seen in Canada. From 1788 Australian law students were trained by means of apprenticeship in legal offices by supervising lawyers who themselves were frequently trained in England or Ireland.[198] The training was “practical,” meaning that students lacked a theoretical understanding of the law.[199] It was rare for an apprentice to learn about governance, philosophy or history for instance, as no centralized list of readings existed to train them.

This changed with the rise of the first Australian universities in the late 1850s, who pursued, briefly, a liberal arts education of law. Beginning in 1857, Melbourne Law School offered lectures which drew influence from Oxford.[200] These early lectures relied heavily on Blackstone’s Commentaries and other English jurisprudential texts.[201] Blackstone’s approach of combining substantial law with jurisprudence may have influenced these early university lectures.[202] Henry Chapman, an early lecturer at Melbourne, said that his classes were meant to “elevate [students’] views above the mere practice of law as a trade”.[203] Although these lectures covered large branches of the common law, they were explicitly non-vocational.[204] Chapman’s idea was to teach students to become “gentlemen,” not tradesmen.[205]

Sydney University began offering law lectures in 1859.[206] Taught by John Fletcher Hargrave, these early lectures were as non-vocational as Melbourne’s.[207] The lectures focused primarily on the conceptual side of law.[208] Hargrave aimed to teach law as a subject of the humanities, training students in jurisprudence.[209] Since the admission bodies did not recognize his course as a pathway to practice, Hargrave lacked any pressure to teach law as a vocational skill.[210]

The focus of these early Australian law schools began shifting towards vocationalism in 1878, when the Chancellor of the University of Sydney, William Manning, proposed that “[Sydney] university should provide not only a liberal education [in law but also] direct legal training”.[211] In the next decade, Sydney University began offering professional degrees in law.[212] These were preceded by degrees at Melbourne in 1857 and Adelaide Law School in 1883.[213]

Adelaide Law School stands out in its pursuit a model of legal education based on the “Oxbridge tutorial,” where students would write essays to be read out in class, critiqued by other students and professors.[214] A founding professor at Adelaide Law, F.W. Pennefather, believed that “the study of law should include the study of ethics, history, politics and economics, all of which [are] involved in the full understanding and scientific development of legal systems”.[215] As such, the original law course included Jurisprudence and Roman Law, with a heavy historical element.[216] This was not to last however. In 1896, Pennefather was forced to resign, due to illness, and the law school thereafter became more vocationally focused – adopting a “thoroughly practical character,” matching the desires of the profession.[217]

By 1894 law graduates from all of these major Australian Law Schools “were exempt” from solicitor exams for admission.[218] This meant there was a direct pathway from a university degree into the legal profession.[219] The admission authorities however, began demanding specific topics be taught, driving the universities away from conceptual teaching.[220]

In the subsequent decades Australian law schools began looking towards America to craft a more practical, technical degree.[221] A combination of “limited funding, small libraries [and] scant research funds” drove the schools to focus on mainly producing professionally trained lawyers, as opposed to “gentlemen” or thinkers.[222] This practical focus made Australia particularly susceptible to Christopher Langdell’s ‘scientific’ case method of instruction.[223] By the late 1880s, Australian law schools had adopted the case method from Harvard.[224] As teaching began in this more formal, case-centric model, the older theoretical approaches to law lost influence.[225] Less and less time was spent on the jurisprudential and sociological aspects of law.[226] By the 1950s, a Harvard Law Dean visiting Australia could say that the Australian “Law Faculties [were] dominated by practical rather than intellectual interests”.[227]

 

The Rise of Critical Legal Studies (CLS):

In the 1970s, a wave of dissent against vocational education started developing in various American and English law schools, formalizing in a movement known as “Critical Legal Studies” (CLS). Borne “out of the 1960s student movement”, Critical Legal Studies was so-called because it aimed to critique the political, moral and social impacts of law on society, rather than narrowly focusing on teaching law as a set of rules.[228] The CLS movement frequently referred to law’s interaction with Marxist ideas on class, hierarchy, gender, race and sexuality.[229] In 1977, the University of Wisconsin began the first in a series of conferences on Critical Legal Studies, cementing the movement as a rising force in the academy.[230]

One of the foremost writers in the CLS movement was Duncan Kennedy, a Professor at Harvard Law School from 1976 to the present day. In 1983, Kennedy wrote a polemic against law schools where he evaluated law schools from a CLS perspective.[231] His polemic begins by suggesting that law schools are intensely “political places,” despite their claims to the contrary.[232] Their political aim, he argues, is to shape students into a corporate mould “for willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state”.[233] By discouraging moral and political dissent, law schools aim to drive all students –whether conservative, liberal or radical- towards jobs in private, corporate firms, to serve private, corporate interests.[234] The preference towards vocational education at law schools is therefore revealed not just as a preference, but as a covert political ideology.

Kennedy was joined by another CLS author and Harvard alumni, Karl E. Klare, in arguing that the ideology of law school is taught almost exclusively via the case method.[235] The case method, according to Klare, is used to separate “public” and “private” thought, where the core law subjects focus on “private” cases from a “market[-centric]” perspective.[236]

In Kennedy’s view, cases are used in law school to enshrine “legal reasoning” above moral thought and social justice, often without any explicit justification.[237] From their earliest lectures, students are taught that their “initial reaction” to a case of “outrage” when a “bad guy wins” is “naïve, non-legal [and] irrelevant… and maybe even substantively wrong”.[238] As a result, most students become disillusioned or detached from their own morality.[239] Instead of critiquing the law, they begin to accept it for the way it is – it becomes “normalized” and apolitical.

When it turns out that the law is actually ideological and that it serves “particular groups” above others, students do not have the tools required to argue this point.[240] Students are instead bullied into accepting “legal reasoning [as] different from policy analysis,” and are expected to accept a case decision even when the logic of the case is “circular, question-begging, incoherent, or so vague as to be meaningless”.[241] In a worst case scenario, an unjust outcome of a case is to be accepted based on appeals to “authority” alone.[242]

In challenging the “law’s ideological neutrality,” Kennedy, Karle and other CLS scholars were arguing against a status quo that all law was apolitical, or somehow separate from the “public” sphere.[243] In reality, the core subjects of law school hid an unseen ideological agenda of hierarchy, status and class; “property rights are understood to confer power… contractual bargaining is never truly equal” and so on.[244] The curriculum itself, said Karle, “is emblematic of the notion that the core of… capitalism is rational, structured and central to the lawyering identity”.[245] To be a lawyer is to think of “incremental reform through governmental regulation” rather than fundamental social change.[246]

One of the central questions of the CLS movement in the 1980s was to ask: “how is it that those who are systematically disadvantaged by the existing order [of law, can come to accept] the legitimacy of the institutions… which perpetuate their subordination?”[247] Kennedy answers this question quite simply. The disadvantaged accept the existing order because they are taught to: via appeals to authority, circular logic and the prevailing idea that the law is not political at all, and does not serve one group over another. By contrast, Kennedy argues for law schools to admit that this is not the case, that they are in fact political, and that they promulgate a hierarchy of social values by their teaching content and methods.

The CLS movement found a home at Macquarie Law School, Australia, where the principles and ideals of the movement were put into practice in the mid-1970s.[248] In a largely Marxist faculty, CLS was seen as a way of critiquing the “traditional norms” of law from a new, radical perspective, which gave voice to dissenting views.[249] The lecture hall was all but abandoned in an attempt to encourage a critical style of learning.[250]Students were discouraged “from seeing themselves as passive recipients of information” but instead forced to “defend their views” in small, tutorial-style classrooms.[251]

The curriculum designed at Macquarie Law was a move away from black letter law, Langdell’s case method and the dominant ideology of legal positivism. Instead of teaching legal doctrine as “pure law”, core subjects were reframed as historical, contextual and philosophical.[252] Macquarie had “no [specific] courses in torts or criminal law” at the time, for instance, and instead “the law on those matters could be found in courses such as Standards of Legal Responsibility, Personal Injury and Notions of Property”.[253] These broader, philosophical subjects looked at the historical context of legal doctrine, how it arose and for whose aims it served.[254]

Instead of sidelining legal history and jurisprudence as “irrelevant” or “soft” subjects, Macquarie took the CLS approach of viewing these as essential to a legal education.[255] Teaching jurisprudence in all subjects was meant to empower students with “intellectual tools” with which to critically examine the law they were being taught.[256]

Macquarie’s experiment with CLS teaching did not last very long. In 1977, the dean of the law school, P.E. Nygh, begun dismantling the faculty.[257] In a letter to staff, Nygh wrote that as dean he was “given a mandate… to create a course of professional training” for students, rather than ideological training.[258] He feared that training students in a Marxist framework could lead to violence as students became “defeatist [about their legal training, and that some could] come to the conclusion that the only answer to the problems of our society is to throw bombs around”.[259] Nygh also referred to the Second World War and his belief that ideology, in all its forms, was a source of evil.[260]

By 1987, the government commissioned Pearce Report recommended the closure of Macquarie Law School due to a lack of “solid legal substance”.[261] Although the law school did not close, the CLS teaching style was abandoned.[262]

There is a danger in reading Macquarie Law School’s example, in categorising “critical thinking” as left wing or Marxist. Historically, critical thinking was advocated by thinkers on both sides of the political divide. The Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas was arguably the greatest critical thinker of the middle ages. In more recent times, the Jesuits perform what amounts to a classical training in critical thought: questioning what they are taught and who they are taught by. It is a relatively recent phenomenon to frame progressives as ‘skeptics’ and ‘critical thinkers’ and conservatives as ‘market-centric.’ A framing which does not serve the purposes of an objective study into critical thinking in law schools.

 

 

Admission Requirements, The Case Method and Black Letter Law:

By the 1990s, vocational legal education had been enshrined in most law schools by a set of compulsory admission requirements. The requirements involved mandating several subjects to be taught. Starting in Ontario in 1957, the Law Society of Upper Canada “prescribed eleven mandatory” subjects for students of law. [263] This was reduced from “eleven to seven” in 1969, following a petition from several law deans.[264] In 1992, the Australian Law Admissions Consultative Committee (LACC) created a list of eleven compulsory subjects (‘The Priestley Eleven’).[265] In 1999, the UK Law Society and the General Council of the Bar created a list of seven compulsory subjects.[266] In the US, no compulsory subjects were created but law schools were required to teach “substantive and procedural law”.[267]

By their very nature, admission requirements homogenised legal education.[268] Compulsory subjects left little room for innovation. Instead, compulsory subjects forced most law schools to teach purely vocational skills.[269] In Australia, the Priestley Eleven subjects contained only one ‘liberal arts’ subject, legal ethics.[270] The rest were largely black letter law, including: torts, contracts, evidence, equity, property law, criminal law, company law, constitutional law, civil and criminal procedure and so on.[271] ‘Black letter law’ units like these tended to be taught via the case method, with a strict focus on learning and applying the law, devoid of contextual and theoretical knowledge.[272]

Unlike in previous decades, by the 1990s admission requirements forced all law schools to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. Any liberal arts or critical law subjects were sidelined to elective units to be taught in later years, optional and arguably subsidiary to the core black letter law units.[273] A renewed focus was placed on the teaching of law as “pure law,” without the “baggage” of the social sciences. Politics, moral philosophy, anthropology and so on were viewed as irrelevant to this aim.[274] More than ever before, the role of law schools was to prepare students to meet admission requirements alone, rather than to broaden the mind of the student.[275]

The growing prevalence of vocational, compulsory subjects had a deleterious effect on student culture. By 1994, Professor William Twining of University College London found that law students had come to internalize this preference for vocational, black letter law units above anything else.[276] When liberal arts subjects were offered as electives in the early 1990s, students would not pick them, preferring electives that “look[ed] good on the C.V.” [277] In other words, as soon as liberal arts units were no longer compulsory, they started to be avoided by the student body. Subjects that “looked good” on the CV were subjects that extended admission units, or subjects focused on black letter law alone. [278]

Various studies in the ensuing decades found a disturbing trend among law students to prioritise career success over ethical integrity, marks over leadership, networking over friendship and private practice over public advocacy.[279] The shift towards a corporate, technical focus in the curriculum was followed by this corporate, technical approach to life.

Witnessing these trends, future Yale Law Professor Anthony Kronman in 1993 declared a “crisis in the legal profession”.[280] Graduates of law school, he said, used to be devoted to an ideal of public service and charity, but were increasingly devoted to becoming a mere “expert in law”.[281] In Kronman’s view, the best lawyers of the past were “lawyer-statesmen”.[282] In short, lawyers capable of practicing law whilst also serving the community.[283] His ideal was based on early American lawyers, including Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.[284] The idea was to subserve your private interests for the interests of the state.

Kronman’s lawyer-statesmen were idealized and romanticized. To be a lawyer-statesman was to be a “devoted citizen”.[285] A lawyer that “cares about the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being” including, if need be, his private interests.[286] A “leader in the realm of public life,” capable of practicing “prudence and practical wisdom”.[287] And someone who was not cold or hard, but practiced a form of “compassion” when making “judgments about the public good” or when choosing between two alternatives.[288]

Compassion was defined narrowly by Kronman as the ability to “sympathize with the values represented by a particular choice” so as to make an “informed” decision.[289] The lawyer-statesman is meant to make all choices in this “sympathetic” light, so as to come to a rational, if “intuitive” decision as to the right outcome of a legal problem.[290]

Admission requirements made it difficult for the emergence of lawyer-statesmen, who were sidelined in a curriculum that only produced employees, rather than leaders.

Voices like Kronman’s were increasingly silenced in the ensuing decades after the 1990s. Where reform in curriculum design and teaching methods was once common in the ‘molten’ years of legal education in the 1910s-1930s, by the 1990s legal education had formalized, solidified and focused around the compulsory black letter subjects. Very little flexibility remained in testing whether law students could be taught, for instance, public service or ‘compassion,’ as defined by Kronman.

Never again would law schools display the same innovation, ingenuity and creativity they had in their earlier years, as growing pressures pushed them towards a firm, vocational mindset.

 

Conclusion:

The history of legal education in common law countries shows a slow but deliberate shift from innovation and experimentation towards a narrow, vocational teaching of law. Despite consistent dissenting voices, the vocational view of law was enshrined over time by admission authorities, law deans and the prevailing economic concerns of students. As time went on, reform became more difficult. Innovations and conceptual education evident in the early law schools in England, America, Canada and Australia were suppressed by the late 1800s to a more market-centric view that dominated the 20^th and early 21^st century. Corporate law and core, black letter law units became the core of the curriculum while liberal arts, the humanities and creative thinking were sidelined.

[1] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 82, 172-174.

[2] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 82, 172-174.

[3] ‘Inns of Court: British Legal Association,’ Encyclopedia Brittanica (1999) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court&gt;; T. W. Tempany, ‘The Legal Profession in England – Its History, Its Members, and Their Status’ 19 American Law Review (1885) 677-678..

[4] ‘Inns of Court: British Legal Association,’ Encyclopedia Brittanica (1999) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court&gt;; T. W. Tempany, ‘The Legal Profession in England – Its History, Its Members, and Their Status’ 19 American Law Review (1885) 677-678..

[5] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82.

[6] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82.

[7] Ralph Michael Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education From Edward I to Langdell’ 57 Chicago Kent Law Review 2 (1981) 430.

[8] ‘Inns of Court: British Legal Association,’ Encyclopedia Brittanica (1999) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court&gt;; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82; Ralph Michael Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education From Edward I to Langdell’ 57 Chicago Kent Law Review 2 (1981) 431.

[9] ‘Inns of Court: British Legal Association,’ Encyclopedia Brittanica (1999) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court&gt;; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82.

[10] Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Legal Education in Australia – A Never Ending Story,’ Australian Law Teachers’ Association Conference (4 July 2011) 8; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82; Ralph Michael Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education From Edward I to Langdell’ 57 Chicago Kent Law Review 2 (1981) 431.

[11] Ralph Michael Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education From Edward I to Langdell’ 57 Chicago Kent Law Review 2 (1981) 432.

[12] ‘Inns of Court: British Legal Association,’ Encyclopedia Brittanica (1999) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court&gt;; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 82.

[13] David Lemmings, Gentlemen and Barristers: The Inns of Court and the English Bar: 1680-1730 (Clarendon Press, 1990); T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 1-4; Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD. Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 70.

[14] David Lemmings, Gentlemen and Barristers: The Inns of Court and the English Bar: 1680-1730 (Clarendon Press, 1990); T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 1-5; Ralph Michael Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education From Edward I to Langdell’ 57 Chicago Kent Law Review 2 (1981) 432-433.

[15] Donald A. Bligh, Ian McNay and Harod Thomas, Understanding Higher Education: An Introduction to Parents, Staff, Employees and Students (Intellect Books, 1999) 20; Michael Segre, Higher Education and the Growth of Knowledge: A Historical Outline of Aims and Tensions (Routledge, 2015) 179.

[16] Peter Clark, British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800: The Origins of an Associational World (Oxford University Press, 2000) 37, quoted in Michael Segre, Higher Education and the Growth of Knowledge: A Historical Outline of Aims and Tensions (Routledge, 2015) 113.

[17] Hugh Hawkins, ‘The Making of the Liberal Arts College’ in Steven Koblik and Stephen Richards Graubard (Eds.) Distinctively American: The Residential Liberal Arts Colleges (Routledge, 2000) 4-6.

[18] Jeffrey A. Becker, ‘Beyond C’s Getting Degrees’ in Susan McWilliams and John E. Seery, The Best Kind of College: An Insider’s Guide to America’s Small Liberal Arts Colleges (SUNY Press, 2015) 190; William Deresiewicz, ‘Don’t Send Your Kids to the Ivy League’ (22 July, 2014) New Republic <https://newrepublic.com/article/118747/ivy-league-schools-are-overrated-send-your-kids-elsewhere&gt;.

[19] David Lemmings, Gentlemen and Barristers: The Inns of Court and the English Bar: 1680-1730 (Clarendon Press, 1990); T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 1-5.

[20] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 83.

[21] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 3.

[22] Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 60-62.

[23] Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 73.

[24] Danielle Thorne, People That Changed the Course of History: The Story of Andrew Jackson: 250 Years After His Birth (Atlantic Publishing, 2016) 29; Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 61; Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 73.

[25] Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 53.

[26] ‘From Oxford to Williamsburg: Part 2 – The College of William & Mary Law School and Wolf Law Library’ 12 Legal Information Management (2012) 292; Jonathon Bush and Alan D. Wijfells, Learning the Law: Teaching and Transmission of English Law, 1150-1900 (Bloomsbury, 1999) 329.

[27] Danielle Thorne, People That Changed the Course of History: The Story of Andrew Jackson: 250 Years After His Birth (Atlantic Publishing, 2016); David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[28] Philip Girard, Lawyers and Legal Culture in British North America: Beaming Murdoch of Halifax (University of Toronto Press, 2011) 32.

[29] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[30] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[31] Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 60-62; Anthony T. Kronman, History of the Yale Law School The Tercentennial Lectures (Yale University Press, 2008) 20.

[32] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[33] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 1-5.

[34] Steve Sheppard (ed.) The History of Legal Education in the United States (The Lawbook Exchange, 1999) 863; A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 3.

[35] William T. Coleman, Counsel for the Situation: Shaping the Law to Realize America’s Promise (Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 44.

[36] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 1-5; Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 73.

[37] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 7.

[38] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 7.

[39] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883).

[40] A.V. Dicey, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ An Inaugural Address at All Souls College (21 April 1883) 8.

[41] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 85; Wilfred Prest, William Blackstone (Oxford University Press, 2008) 150.

[42] Christopher Brooks and Michael Lobban (eds.) Lawyers, Litigation & English Society Since 1450 (Bloomsbury, 1998) 153;Anthony T. Kronman, History of the Yale Law School The Tercentennial Lectures (Yale University Press, 2008) 20;

[43] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769).

[44] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) 30.

[45] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) 18.

[46] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) 18.

[47] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) 18, 30.

[48] T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 5.

[49] William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) 1-5, 18, 30.

[50] William Blackstone, ‘Book 1: Chapter 2,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) <http://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/bla-102/&gt;.

[51] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769); Wilfrid Prest, ‘Antipodean Blackstone: The Commentaries ‘Down Under’ 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform (2002) 154.

[52] T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 5.

[53] Wilfrid Prest, ‘Antipodean Blackstone: The Commentaries ‘Down Under’ 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform (2002) 153.

[54] T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 5.

[55] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;; .Wilfred Prest, William Blackstone (Oxford University Press, 2008) 168.

[56] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994), Hamlyn Lectures #46 (1934) 24.

[57] ‘History of the Faculty,’ Faculty of Law: Cambridge University <http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/about-faculty/history-faculty&gt;; William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994), Hamlyn Lectures #46 (1934) 24.

[58] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994), Hamlyn Lectures #46 (1934) 25.

[59] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994), Hamlyn Lectures #46 (1934) 25.

[60] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 242, 253.

[61] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 243.

[62] The nickname ‘Rann’ is here used to not confuse the reader with the two later Kennedys in this chapter. W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 243.

[63] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 267.

[64] The Queen’s College, Birmingham: 1851-52 (Tonks, 1851) 14.

[65] The Queen’s College, Birmingham: 1851-52 (Tonks, 1851) 14.

[66] The Queen’s College, Birmingham: 1851-52 (Tonks, 1851) 14.

[67] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 270.

[68] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 271.

[69] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 271.

[70] Kennedy, Address to the Mutual Law Association 9, quoted in W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 276-277.

[71] W. Wesley Pue, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 1850s’ 33 The American Journal of Legal History 3 (1989) 276.

[72] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994), Hamlyn Lectures #46 (1934) 24.

[73] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 85; Loyita Worley and Sarah Spells (eds,) BIALL Handbook of Legal Information Management (Routledge, 2016, 2^nd ed.) 29.

[74] T. Raleigh, ‘Legal Education in England,’ 10 Juridical Review 1 (1898) 6; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 83.

[75] ‘The Training Contract,’ Solicitors Regulation Authority <https://web.archive.org/web/20081227075521/http://www.sra.org.uk/students/training-contract.page&gt;.

[76] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 83.

[77] Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future’ 58 Journal of Legal Education 1 (2008) 83.

[78] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[79] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;; Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 142.

[80] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[81] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[82] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 535

[83] William Blackstone, ‘Introduction,’ Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765-1769).

[84] W. Edwin Hemphill, ‘George Wythe, America’s First Law Professor’ Thesis in Law at Emory University (1933) 53.

[85] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[86] Thomas Jefferson, quoted in David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[87] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 538; David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[88] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 538; David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[89] David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[90] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 538; David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[91] Thomas Jefferson, ‘From Thomas Jefferson to Francis Eppes’ (16 September 1821) quoted in Morris L. Cohen, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,’ 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 823, 828.

[92] Thomas Jefferson, ‘From Thomas Jefferson to Francis Eppes’ (16 September 1821) quoted in Morris L. Cohen, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,’ 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 823, 828.

[93] Morris L. Cohen, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,’ 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 823, 832.

[94] Morris L. Cohen, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,’ 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 823, 831-832.

[95] Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jeferson (June 11, 1970) 480, quoted in Morris L. Cohen, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study,’ 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 823, 828; Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 531; Robert Lefcourt, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education From Colonial Times to the Civil War’ (1983) PhD Certificate, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 144.

[96] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 528; David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[97] Thomas Jefferson, ‘Thomas Jefferson to Larkin Smith’ (15 April 1809), Founders Online <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0118&gt;.

[98] Paul D. Carrington, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ 31 William and Mary Law Review 3, 528; David M. Douglas, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled,’ William & Mary Alumni Magazine (2010) <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php&gt;.

[99] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1275.

[100] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1275.

[101] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1282.

[102] Christopher Columbus Langdell, quoted in William Schofield, ‘Christopher Columbus Langdell’ 55 The American Law Register 5 (1907) 278.

[103] Christopher Columbus Langdell, quoted in William Schofield, ‘Christopher Columbus Langdell’ 55 The American Law Register 5 (1907) 278.

[104] ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (July 7 2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/&gt;; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007).

[105] ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (July 7 2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/&gt;; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007).

[106] Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ‘The Path of the Law’ 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897).

[107] Franz Kafka, Before the Law, Ian Johnston (trans.) (Kurt Wolff, 1919).

[108] John R Morss, ‘Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Legal Positivism and Legal Education’, (2008) 18 Legal Education Review 55, 3.

[109] William Schofield, ‘Christopher Columbus Langdell’ 55 The American Law Register 5 (1907) 277.

[110] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1275; Bruce A. Kimball, ‘The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr. Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890-191’ (2006) 46 History of Education Quarterly 2.

[111] Wes Pue, ‘Making Manitoba Lawyers: 1885-1931’ (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 525-530.

[112] James Aikins, “Inaugural Address of the President, Sir James Aikins, K.C., KIL, Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba” (1918) 54 Can. L.J. 344, quoted in Wes Pue, ‘Making Manitoba Lawyers: 1885-1931’ (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 531.

[113] M.B. Katz, ‘The Origins of Public Education: A Reassesment,” 16 History of Education Quarterly 4 (1976) 381 quoted in Kathleen Fulton, Ethan T. Leonard and Kathleen McCormally, Education & Technology: Future Visions (Diane Publishing, 1995) 41.

[114] N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995) 236.

[115] Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 157.

[116] N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995) 234-238.

[117] N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995) 237.

[118] Roscoe Pound, ‘The Evolution of Legal Education,’ Inaugural Lecture (September 19, 1903) 15.

[119] Roscoe Pound, ‘The Evolution of Legal Education,’ Inaugural Lecture (September 19, 1903) 15.

[120] Roscoe Pound, ‘The Evolution of Legal Education,’ Inaugural Lecture (September 19, 1903) 15, 17, 19.

[121] N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995) 236-237, 241.

[122] Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 59.

[123] Roscoe Pound, Taught Law, 3 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 164, 172 (1912).

[124] Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 59.

[125] John Henry Schlegel, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfield: On the Difficulty of Becoming a Law Professor,’ Bufallo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper no. 2016 – 036, 4.

[126] John Henry Schlegel, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfield: On the Difficulty of Becoming a Law Professor,’ Bufallo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper no. 2016 – 036, 4.

[127] Karl N. Llewellyn et al, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Teacher,’ 28 Yale Law Journal 8, 796.

[128] Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: How American Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day,’ Address to the Association of American Law Schools, 24.

[129] Eugene Ehrlich quoted in, Letter from Roscoe Pound to Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995) 269.

[130] N. E.H. Hull, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919,’ 45 Journal of Legal Education 2 (1995).

[131] John Henry Schlegel, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfield: On the Difficulty of Becoming a Law Professor,’ Bufallo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper no. 2016 – 036, 30.

[132] Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 2643, 521.

[133] Arthur Corbin, quoted in Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 2643, 521.

[134] Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 2643, 521.

[135] Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 2643, 521.

[136] Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 2643, 521.

[137] Thomas W. Swan, ‘Report of The Dean,’ Yale Law School (1919-1920) 393-394, quoted in Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 135.

[138] Thomas W. Swan, ‘Report of The Dean,’ Yale Law School (1919-1920) 393-394, quoted in Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 135.

[139] Thomas W. Swan, ‘Report of The Dean,’ Yale Law School (1919-1920) 393-394, quoted in Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 135.

[140] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[141] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[142] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 82, 172-174.

[143] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 46; G. Blaine Bake, ‘Legal Education in Upper Canada 1785-1889’ in David H. Flaherty (ed.) Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Osgoode Society, 2012) 58.

[144] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[145] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[146] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[147] W.P.M. Kennedy, quoted in R.C. B. Risk, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy,’ 48 The University of Toronto Law Journal 3 (1998) 366.

[148] W.P.M. Kennedy, quoted in R.C. B. Risk, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy,’ 48 The University of Toronto Law Journal 3 (1998) 366.

[149] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[150] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[151] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Legal Subjects in the Universities of Canada’ 23 Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law (1933) 27.

[152] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Legal Subjects in the Universities of Canada’ 23 Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law (1933) 27.

[153] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Legal Subjects in the Universities of Canada’ 23 Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law (1933) 26-27.

[154] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 48.

[155] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 48.

[156] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[157] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 47.

[158] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 47.

[159] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 49.

[160] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 49.

[161] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Legal Subjects in the Universities of Canada’ 23 Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law (1933) 26-27.

[162] R.C. B. Risk, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy,’ 48 The University of Toronto Law Journal 3 (1998) 366.

[163] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Some Aspects of Family Law’ (1937) 49 Judicial Review 1, 18, quoted in R.C. B. Risk, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy,’ 48 The University of Toronto Law Journal 3 (1998) 367.

[164] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[165] W.P.M. Kennedy, A Project of Legal Education (1937) Scots Law Times 1, 1.

[166] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[167] W.P.M. Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal, 100, 100.

[168] Martin Freeman, ‘Introduction’ in W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development and Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) xxix.

[169] Martin Freeman, ‘Introduction’ in W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development and Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) xxviii.

[170] Martin Freeman, ‘Introduction’ in W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development and Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) xxviii.

[171] R.C. B. Risk, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy,’ 48 The University of Toronto Law Journal 3 (1998) 375.

[172] Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 174.

[173] Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 167-169; ‘History,’ Canadian Bar Association <http://cbant.org/Who-We-Are/About-us/History&gt;.

[174] Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 168.

[175] Rob McQueen and Wesley W. Pue (eds.) Misplaced Traditions: British Lawyers, Colonial Peopls (Federation Press, 1999) 91.

[176] Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 171.

[177] Rob McQueen and Wesley W. Pue (eds.) Misplaced Traditions: British Lawyers, Colonial Peopls (Federation Press, 1999) 91.

[178] Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 1780-1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 171.

[179] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 82, 172-174.

[180] Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 82, 172-174.

[181] C. Ian Kyer and Jerome Edmund Bickenbach, Fiercest Debate (Osgoode Hall Society, 1987) 58, quoted in Wes Pue, ‘Making Manitoba Lawyers: 1885-1931’ (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 532.

[182] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 34.

[183] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 34.

[184] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 34.

[185] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 36.

[186] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 33-34.

[187] ‘Legal Education in Canada,’ Society of Public Teachers of Law 4 (1933) 36.

[188] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983).

[189] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) ii, iv.

[190] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) ii, iv.

[191] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) 49; Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Law School, The Profession, And Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 157.

 

[192] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) 49; Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Law School, The Profession, And Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 157.

 

[193] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) 59.

[194] Harry W. Arthurs et al, ‘Law and Learning,’ Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) 155; Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Law School, The Profession, And Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 158.

[195] Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Law School, The Profession, And Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 158; Julian Webb, ‘The “Ambitious Modesty” of Harry Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ 44 (2006) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 122.

[196] Robert W. Gordon, ‘The Law School, The Profession, And Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 158; Julian Webb, ‘The “Ambitious Modesty” of Harry Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ 44 (2006) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 122.

[197] Julian Webb, ‘The “Ambitious Modesty” of Harry Arthurs’ Humane Professionalism,’ 44 (2006) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 130.

[198] John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857-2007 (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 5; David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 121.

[199] Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Legal Education in Australia – A Never Ending Story,’ Australian Law Teachers’ Association Conference (4 July 2011) 14.

[200] David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 120.

[201] John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857-2007 (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 12-14; Wilfrid Prest, ‘Antipodean Blackstone: The Commentaries ‘Down Under’ 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform (2002) 155, 161.

[202] Wilfrid Prest, ‘Antipodean Blackstone: The Commentaries ‘Down Under’ 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform (2002) 155, 161.

[203] John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857-2007 (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 15.

[204] John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857-2007 (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 15.

[205] John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857-2007 (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 15.

[206] Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Legal Education in Australia – A Never Ending Story,’ Australian Law Teachers’ Association Conference (4 July 2011) 16.

[207] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[208] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[209] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[210] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[211] William Manning, quoted in Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 16.

[212] David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 122.

[213] Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Legal Education in Australia – A Never Ending Story,’ Australian Law Teachers’ Association Conference (4 July 2011) 16.

[214] Paul Babie, ‘125 Years of Legal Education in South Australia’ 31 Adelaide Law Review 107, 107.

[215] Victor Allen Edgaloe, ‘The Adelaide Law School 1883-1983’ 9 Adelaide Law Review 1 (1983) 7-9.

[216] Victor Allen Edgaloe, ‘The Adelaide Law School 1883-1983’ 9 Adelaide Law Review 1 (1983) 3-4,7-9.

[217] Victor Allen Edgaloe, ‘The Adelaide Law School 1883-1983’ 9 Adelaide Law Review 1 (1983) 3, 11; Paul Babie, ‘125 Years of Legal Education in South Australia’ 31 Adelaide Law Review 107, 107.

[218] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[219] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5. 16.

[220] David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 122.

[221] David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 123.

[222] David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 123.

[223] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1275; Bruce A. Kimball, ‘The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr. Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890-191’ (2006) 46 History of Education Quarterly 2.

[224] Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 4, 1275; Bruce A. Kimball, ‘The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr. Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890-191’ (2006) 46 History of Education Quarterly 2.

[225] Michael Kirby, ‘Right Now,’ Speech to Melbourne Law School (January, 2007).

[226] Michael Kirby, ‘Right Now,’ Speech to Melbourne Law School (January, 2007).

[227] Erwin Griswold, quoted in David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 123.

[228] Guyora Binder, ‘Critical Legal Studies,’ in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2^nd edition, Blackwell Publishing) 267.

[229] Guyora Binder, ‘Critical Legal Studies,’ in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2^nd edition, Blackwell Publishing) 267.

[230] Abram Chayes et. al, ‘Critical Legal Studies Movement,’ The Bridge, Harvard University <http://cyber.harvard.edu.au/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm&gt;.

[231] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983).

[232] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 54.

[233] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 54.

[234] Karl E. Klare, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 Legal Education 336; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 55, 64.

[235] Karl E. Klare, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 Legal Education 336; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 58.

[236] Karl E. Klare, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 Legal Education 338-339.

[237] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 73.

[238] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 58.

[239] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 73.

[240] Sally E. Hadden & Alfred L. Brophy (eds.), A Companion to American Legal History (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 172.

[241] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 60.

[242] Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983) 60.

[243] Sally E. Hadden & Alfred L. Brophy (eds.), A Companion to American Legal History (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 463.

[244] Guyora Binder, ‘Critical Legal Studies,’ in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2^nd edition, Blackwell Publishing, 1999) 268.

[245] Karl E. Klare, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 Legal Education 339.

[246] Karl E. Klare, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 Legal Education 339.

[247] Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 11.

[248] Margaret Thornton, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 2011) 62.

[249] Drew Fraser and Patrick Kavanagh ‘Readings in the History and Philosophy of Law’, Macquarie University School of Law (1995) 2.

[250] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 22.

[251] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 22.

[252] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 22-23

[253] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 22-23

[254] Drew Fraser and Patrick Kavanagh ‘Readings in the History and Philosophy of Law’, Macquarie University School of Law (1995) 2.

[255] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 23.

[256] Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 23.

[257] P.E. Nygh, ‘Memorandum to: Law School Staff’ quoted in Gill H. Boehringer, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 57.

[258] P.E. Nygh, ‘Memorandum to: Law School Staff’ quoted in Gill H. Boehringer, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 57.

[259] P.E. Nygh, ‘Memorandum to: Law School Staff’ quoted in Gill H. Boehringer, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 57.

[260] P.E. Nygh, ‘Memorandum to: Law School Staff’ quoted in Gill H. Boehringer, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988-1999) Australian Journal of Law & Society 5, 57.

[261] Margaret Thornton, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 2011)

[262] Margaret Thornton, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 2011)

[263] Taskforce on the Canadian Common Law Degree, ‘Consultation Paper,’ Federation of Law Societies of Canada (2008) 10-11.

[264] Taskforce on the Canadian Common Law Degree, ‘Consultation Paper,’ Federation of Law Societies of Canada (2008) 10-11.

[265] LACC, ‘Law Admissions Consultative Committee: Uniform Admission Requirements’ <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/pdfs/UniformAdmissionArrangementssubmissiontoCOAGTaskforce.pdf> 3.

[266] ‘Academic Stage Handbook’ (2014) Bar Standards Board & Solicitors Regulation Authority, 18.

[267] ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (2015-2016) 302(a).

[268] LACC, ‘Law Admissions Consultative Committee: Uniform Admission Requirements’ <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/pdfs/UniformAdmissionArrangementssubmissiontoCOAGTaskforce.pdf> 3-5.

[269] ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (July 7 2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/&gt;; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007).

[270] ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (July 7 2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/&gt;; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007).

[271] ‘The Pure Theory of Law’ (July 7 2010) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/&gt;; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007).

[272] Michael Robertson et al, (eds.) The Ethics Project in Legal Education (Routledge, 2011) [8.3.3].

[273] LACC, ‘Law Admissions Consultative Committee: Uniform Admission Requirements’ <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/pdfs/UniformAdmissionArrangementssubmissiontoCOAGTaskforce.pdf> 3-5.

[274] Michael Robertson et al, (eds.) The Ethics Project in Legal Education (Routledge, 2011) [8.3.3].

[275] Michael Robertson et al, (eds.) The Ethics Project in Legal Education (Routledge, 2011) [8.3.3].

[276] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Steven & Sons/Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 74-75.

[277] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Steven & Sons/Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 74-75.

[278] William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Steven & Sons/Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 74-75.

[279] Massimilo Tani and Prue Vines, ‘Law Students’ Attitudes to Education: Pointers to Depression in the Legal Academy and the Profession?’ (2009) 19(1) Legal Education Review 3, 24-25; Molly Townes O’Brien, Stephen Tang and Kath Hall, ‘Changing Our Thinking: Empirical Research on Law Student Wellbeing, Thinking Styles and the Curriculum’ (2011) 21(1/2) Legal Education Review 149; Judy Allen and Paula Baron, ‘Buttercup Goes to Law School: Student Wellbeing in Stressed Law Schools’ (2004) 29(6) Alternative Law Journal 285, 286-288.

[280] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 1.

[281] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 1-2.

[282] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 11.

[283] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 11.

[284] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 11.

[285] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 14.

[286] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 14.

[287] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 15-16, 154.

[288] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 65-70.

[289] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 71.

[290] Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 65-70.